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1 Introduction
Banks realize that an unpleasant but expected outcome of making loans to a large number
of borrowers is that a fraction of these borrowers will default on their loans. Since
banks largely make loans with borrowed funds, regulations require them to charge-off the
expected value of funds that are lost due to defaults.1 These losses stem from at least
two sources. First, the value of the repossessed collateral and any seized returns may not
cover the principal and interest due to the bank. Second, there may be costs related to
the default (and associated bankruptcy proceedings) which need to be accounted for.
It is well known that default rates tend to increase during recessions and fall during
booms. Figure 1 displays this counter-cyclical pattern with defaults shown as diamonds
and real GDP as a solid line. Figure 1 also plots the behavior of charge-offs (stars) for the
U.S. banking system and not surprisingly, charge-offs appear to be positively correlated
with defaults and negatively correlated with GDP.2 What is surprising is that charge-
offs do not simply follow the path of defaults. While defaults are about 15 times more
volatile than output, charge-offs vary much more – about 22 times more volatile than
output. Moreover, a second glance at Figure 1 makes apparent that the co-movement of
charge-offs and defaults is highly imperfect (correlation coefficient of 0.7).
To further investigate the joint behavior of defaults and charge-offs, we express them
as a ratio and find that the ratio of charge-offs to defaults (COD henceforth) is indeed
highly variable, as suggested by Figure 1, and negatively correlated with GDP. In U.S.
data, the standard deviation of COD relative to the standard deviation of GDP is 15.6
and the correlation between these two variables is -0.2. More empirical moments about
COD are presented in section 2.
1Regulators expect banks to set aside resources called loan-loss provisions when making loans. As
loan losses are actually realized, the bank takes charge-offs, equaling the value of loans removed from
banks books. These are then deducted from the provisions that had been made for loan losses.
2Using quarterly FDIC data on insured commercial banks and savings institutions covering 1984Q1
to 2016Q1, we measure charge-offs as total charge-offs while defaults are measured as loans and leases
90 days or more past due. Both series are deflated using the GDP deflator and population. All series
are detrended using the HP filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1600.
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Figure 1: U.S. GDP (line); Defaults (diamonds); Charge-offs (stars)
These new stylized facts raise a number of questions that we wish to explore in this
paper. First, why should we expect banks to vary the ratio of charge-offs to defaults over
time? Second, why is this ratio counter-cyclical? Third, is the joint behavior of charge-
offs and defaults consistent with the predictions of business cycle models? Intuitively,
and somewhat mechanically, the answer to the first question is obvious. If banks expect
to pay higher default costs than normal or if the return on the repossesed assets is
smaller than normal then banks need to charge-off more than “usual” and this results
in a rise in the ratio of charge-offs to defaults. In order to shed light on the question of
why the COD ratio varies negatively with the business cycle, we turn to the canonical
business cycle framework that links the banking sector with real economic activity. This
framework, which encompasses the financial accelerator models of Bernanke et al. (1999)
and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) (and models that build on it) is not only popular but
particularly relevant for our question because it implies a loan contract between banks
and borrowers in which the default rate is endogenously determined and responds to
macroeconomic shocks. Moreover, a key aspect of the framework, consistent with reality,
is a representative bank budget constraint which allows losses associated with defaults
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to emerge from both sources outlined above. This allows the model to make predictions
about the dynamics of aggregate defaults, and implicitly, also about aggregate charge-
offs. While it is well known that financial accelerator models can generate counter-cyclical
defaults, little is known about their implications for charge-offs or for the COD ratio.
We take an off-the-shelf financial accelerator model augmented with New-Keynesian
features in order to explore the endogenous response of COD to a large number of shocks
that generate business cycles (henceforth referred to as the baseline model). We find
that none of the shocks, (together or separately) are able to capture the joint behavior
of charge-offs and defaults summarized above. This baseline financial accelerator model
implies a near perfect correlation between the two variables and so is unable to generate
much variance in the COD ratio. We discuss the reasons behind this failure in more
detail in section 3.5 but it emerges from the value of repossessed assets from defaulted
loans not moving enough to capture the variance in the COD ratio.
Next, we show that a simple modification of the baseline model can break the tight link
between charge-offs and defaults. This modification boils down to introducing exogenous
variation in default costs of the representative bank as suggested by Gunn and Johri
(2013). Having established that default cost shocks can increase the variance of COD
in principle, we proceed to estimate an augmented version of the baseline model (called
the full model) which includes our default cost process and all of the shocks already
included in the baseline model. This procedure allows aggregate U.S. data to discipline
the default cost shocks. We find that the full model not only captures a significant
amount of variation in aggregate banking data including COD and credit spreads, but
also in the standard macroeconomic series studied in the business cycle literature. We
note that COD is not used as an observable in the estimation of the full model so that
it can be used to test the external validity of the baseline and full models.
To summarize, the cyclical movements of the COD ratio present a challenge to conven-
tional financial accelerator models. Our interpretation of the data and model simulations
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is that variation in default costs are a disturbance to the banking system that is large
enough to cause aggregate fluctuations consistent with both macroeconomic data and
the COD ratio. The reason COD is counter-cyclical is because a rise in default costs
causes banks to increase charge-offs more than the rise in the fraction of loans that are
in default. Defaults rise because banks offer worse terms to borrowers by increasing the
spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate for any given amount of leverage.
This leads to reduced borrowing in equilibrium and a recession with lower investment,
output and hours induced by shocks in the banking sector.
1.1 Literature review
We view our study as part of a growing literature that argues that variation in intermedi-
ation costs are a feature of U.S. data and that this variation has important implications
for business cycles. Ajello (2016) explores stochastic variation in intermediation costs to
generate movements in credit spreads and aggregate time series. Our focus on the joint
behaviour of charge-offs over defaults allows us to distinguish between two distinct types
of intermediation costs: those that are specifically related to defaulted funds and those
that are not. While all intermediation costs create a wedge between the lending rate and
the deposit rate (credit spread), only default costs create a wedge between charge-offs
and defaults. We use our COD data to provide external validity to our estimated DSGE
model with stochastic default cost shocks. In their presence, the model can generate
a highly volatile COD series while in their absence, the combined effect of all macroe-
conomic shocks is unable to generate this volatility. Since Ajello (2016) builds on the
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) framework, there are no equilibrium defaults. As a result
that model does not speak to our COD data. Despite these and other differences, we
note some important implications that are common. Like us, Ajello (2016) finds that in-
termediation cost shocks are important drivers of aggregate output and investment. This
suggests that the widely noted relationship between credit spreads and macroeconomic
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activity may emerge from a number of distinct sources within the financial sector.3
Exogenous variation in credit spreads driven by some form of intermediation cost can
be found in a number of other studies. Curdia and Woodford (2009) study monetary
policy in a New Keynesian model where intermediaries face stochastic variation in these
costs but they do not take the model to the data. Similarly, impulse responses to shocks
to a more fully specified loan production technology that takes as inputs labor and col-
lateral can be found in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007). News about intermediation
cost shocks can be found in Gunn and Johri (2011). See also earlier work in Cooper and
Ejarque (2000). Our model, building on Gunn and Johri (2013), differs from all these
studies in that stochastic variation in the cost of banks is embedded into a model where
loan contracts with entrepreneurs are endogenously determined in equilibrium. The equi-
librium combination of leverage and external finance premium (or credit spread) chosen
by agents in equilibrium depend on bank costs so that neither is entirely exogenously
driven but can respond to shocks within and outside the financial sector.4 In our model
loan contracts also respond to news about future variation in default costs. Indeed the
estimation assigns a significant role to news shocks.
Microeconomic evidence on time varying default costs can be found in the work of
Levin et al. (2004) who construct a panel of 900 U.S. firms from 1997Q1 to 2003Q3. Using
balance sheet information, expected default probabilities and credit spreads, the authors
estimate the parameters that govern the financial contract implied by the Bernanke
et al. (1999) model, including the costs associated with defaulted loans. Levin et al.
(2004) find that these costs vary systematically over the business cycle, rising during
recessions and falling below mean levels during booms. While our structural DSGE
3The negative relationship between credit spreads and aggregate economic activity has been well
known for some time but has been highlighted in Gilchrist and Zakrajek (2012) who construct an
index of credit spreads and show that increases in this spread index are highly predictive of falls in
future economic activity, even more so than the traditional spread between risky corporate bonds and
government bonds.
4Aysun and Honig (2011) study the impact of different levels of intermediation costs on an economy
facing sudden stops. Unlike us, they do not model default costs as a stochastic process.
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model also incorporates the same equations that characterize the loan contract between
intermediaries and firms, the informational content of our estimation of default costs
differs in that we do not use balance sheet data to tie down our shocks. Moreover, we use
aggregate data to estimate the aggregate default costs as opposed to firm level data. In
section 3.5, we show the relationship between COD, our exogenous default cost shocks
and an endogenous expression that captures the general equilibrium effects of all other
possible shocks. This relationship potentially defines a wedge between the implications
of existing financial accelerator models and our COD data which we interpret in terms of
stochastic variation in default costs and show that these shocks are empirically relevant
for understanding U.S. business cycles.
We view the micro evidence in Levin et al. (2004) as corroborating our work based
on aggregate time series. Gunn and Johri (2013) incorporated surprise and anticipated
shocks to default costs in a real version of a financial accelerator model in order to explain
the boom-bust cycle associated with the Great Recession. While that paper was solely
concerned with the financial crisis and associated recession, our work here shows that
both surprise shocks and news shocks to the default cost process are of great importance
in accounting for the joint dynamics of charge-offs and defaults, credit spreads, as well
as other macroeconomic variables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence on the ratio
of charge-offs to defaults. Section 3 presents a summary of the model with a focus on the
financial intermediary while other model elements which are common to a host of New
Keynesian and Financial Accelerator models are relegated to the Appendix. We report
results in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
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2 Empirical evidence on the charge-offs to defaults
ratio
This section presents descriptive statistics on the COD ratio and documents its corre-
lation to key macro and financial variables. We use quarterly FDIC data on insured
commercial banks and savings institutions covering 1984Q1 to 2015Q4. We measure
charge-offs as total charge-offs while defaults are measured as loans and leases 90 days
or more past due. In terms of descriptive statistics, the COD ratio (no filtering or de-
trending) has a mean of 56% and a standard deviation of 22% in our sample. Clearly,
the amount charged-off by banks is not a constant fraction of the amount defaulted on
loans.
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Figure 2: Cyclical component of COD and Y in U.S. data
To document the relationship of the COD ratio with other variables over the business
cycle we detrend all the time series using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter
equal to 1600.5 We first compare the cyclical components of COD and GDP in Figure 2.
5More details on our data can be found in the Appendix.
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Movements in the two series appear to be negatively correlated. This pattern is especially
apparent over the last two cycles. Table 1 presents the correlation of COD with some
key variables. COD is negatively correlated with GDP and aggregate investment and
positively correlated with credit spread. The table also shows that credit spread is more
volatile than the COD ratio (18 and 16.4 respectively) while investment (4.5) and GDP
(1.1) are much less volatile.
We now turn to the description of our model.
Table 1: Statistics
Panel 1: U.S. data 1984Q1-2015Q4
Y I cdt sprd COD
correl w/ COD -0.2 -0.3 0.4 1.0
Std Dev. 1.1 4.5 18.0 16.4
3 Model
The model economy is a relatively standard New Keynesian framework with the addi-
tion of a financial accelerator mechanism from Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
The model builds on Gunn (2018), which is a New Keynesian interpretation of the real
model of Gunn and Johri (2013) that features a stochastic default cost process. The
economy consists of a large number of identical households, a single competitive final
goods firm, a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods firms, one
each of a competitive capital-producer and financial intermediary, a continuum of risk-
neutral entrepreneurs indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], a continuum of monopolistically competition
labour unions, a competitive employment agency and a monetary policy authority. The
nominal frictions include Calvo-style wage and price stickiness with partial indexation.
We follow the decentralization of Schmitt-Grohe et al. (2007) and Smets and Wouters
(2007) whereby a monopolistic union buys homogeneous labour from households, trans-
forms it into a differentiated labour inputs, and sells it to the employment agency who
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aggregates the differentiated labour into a composite which it then sells to intermediate
goods producers. Since this particular decentralization of wage stickiness implies that
consumption and hours are identical across households, for simplicity we will refer to
a stand-in representative household. The monetary policy authority sets the nominal
interest rate using a rule which is a function of the inflation rate, the output growth rate
and the past nominal interest rate.
There are seven stochastic processes in the model: Jt (preference), νpt (price markup),
νwt (wage markup), zt (neutral technology), θt (default cost), ηt (monetary policy) and
mt (marginal efficiency of investment)
6. The processes for technology shocks and default
cost shocks both include a four-period ahead anticipated component. We refer to the
version of the model with all seven stochastic processes as the full model. In addition,
throughout our analysis, we also consider a version of the model where we shut-down the
default cost process θt such that θ is constant, only including the six remaining stochastic
processes commonly found in the literature. We refer to this as the baseline model.
Our description of the model in the main text focuses on the financial sector portion
while other model elements which are common to a host of New Keynesian and Financial
Accelerator models are relegated to Appendix A.
3.1 Financial Intermediary
At the end of each period t the financial intermediary makes a portfolio of loans to the
measure of entrepreneurs, with Bit+1 denoting the loan to the i
th entrepreneur, funding
this portfolio of loans by issuing securities, At+1, to the household that promise a risk-
free gross return, Rat+1. The financial intermediary has no other sources of funds, and
thus it must generate a total return on its loan portfolio in each aggregate contingency
to just cover its opportunity cost of funds on the household securities. As in Bernanke
et al. (1999), each risk-neutral entrepreneur bears all the aggregate risk on its loan and
6For more details, see the description of stochastic processes in section A.8.
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thus makes state-contingent loan payments that ensure that in each aggregate state of the
world the financial intermediary achieves an expected return equal to its opportunity cost
of funds. This leaves the intermediary with only the idiosyncratic risk associated with
individual loans, which it can diversify away by virtue of holding a large loan portfolio.
3.2 Entrepreneurs
Risk-neutral entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital and make the capacity utilization
decisions for their capital. The timing of the decisions of the ith entrepreneur is as follows.
The entrepreneur enters into period t with predetermined capital stock Kit, purchased
at the end of the previous period from capital producers for price qt−1, as well as debt
obligations Bit. After observing the aggregate state in period t, the entrepreneur chooses
the capital utilization rate uit and then rents capital services K˜it = uitKit at rental
rate rt to intermediate goods firms. The entrepreneur then sells its entire capital stock
to capital-goods producers for price q¯t, realizing its ex-post return to that capital, R
k
it,
given by
Rkit = ωit
[
uitrt − a(uit) + q¯t
qt−1
]
. (1)
In the above expression, ωi is a random variable providing an idiosyncratic component
to entrepreneur i’s return, such that the ex-ante return to capital is subject to both
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The random variable ω is i.i.d across firms and time, has
cumulative distribution function F (ω), and is normalized so that Eω = 1. Note that the
entrepreneur observes this idiosyncratic component when realizing its return, but after
making its capacity utilization decision. As in Christiano et al. (2003), entrepreneurs
incur a cost a(uit) per unit of capital in terms of goods for utilization rate uit, where
a′(·), a′′(·) > 0, such that changing utilization influences the enterpreneur’s return to
capital as in (1). The parameter controling the curvature of the cost function is denoted
u.
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After realizing its return, the entrepreneur makes any necessary payments to the
financial intermediary to fulfill the terms of its contract determined the previous period.
Finally at the end of the period, the entrepreneur chooses its desired level of capital,
Kit+1, to hold into the following period, buying it from the capital producer for price qt.
Entrepreneurs finance these capital purchases with their own end-of-period net-worth,
Xit+1, and new loans from the financial intermediary Bit+1, such that their financing
satisfies
qtKit+1 = Xit+1 +Bit+1. (2)
Entrepreneurs face a constant probability, γ, of surviving into the next period. When
entrepreneurs die they consume their entrepreneurial equity, ceit. Finally, entrepreneurs
supply a unit time endowment inelastically to the good-producers at wage-rate wet .
3.3 Agency problem and debt-contract
The financial intermediary can observe the average return to capital Rkt but not an
entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic component ωit, unless it pays a monitoring cost. As a con-
sequence the parties can adopt a financial contract that minimizes the expected agency
costs, in the form of risky-debt where the monitoring costs are incurred only in states
where an entrepreneur fails to make promised debt payments. In the model we pool this
monitoring cost along with all other costs related to the default process and refer to them
as “default costs.” As in Bernanke et al. (1999) these default costs take the form of a
fraction, θt, of the entrepreneur’s gross payout, ωitR
k
t qt−1Kit, however, unlike Bernanke
et al. (1999), here θt is time-varying and follows an exogenous stationary stochastic pro-
cess around its steady state. We refer to it as a default cost (DC) shock, common to all
entrepreneurs, and observable by all agents in the economy.
At the end of period t, the entrepreneur chooses its capital expenditures, qtKit+1 and
associated level of borrowing, Bit+1, with knowledge of neither the aggregate state in
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period t + 1 nor the idiosyncratic realization of ω in period t + 1, ωit+1. Conditional
on these choices, the terms of the contract between the financial intermediary and the
entrepreneur specify a contractual non-default state-contingent gross interest rate, Rlit+1
that ensures that in each aggregate state of the world, the financial intermediary achieves
an expected return, net of costs, equal to the its opportunity cost of funds. In the event
that the entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic returns are insufficient to cover its contracted debt
payments, the entrepreneur defaults and goes bankrupt, handing over all remaining gross
returns to the financial intermediary, leaving the gross returns less default costs to the
financial intermediary. Note that given the state-contingent contract structure, the loan
rate Rlit will adjust in period t to reflect the ex-post realization of the aggregate state in
t. We show in the appendix that such a contract results in the condition
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKit+1 = Rat+1 (qtKit+1 −Xit+1) , (3)
where ω¯it+1 is a “cut-off” level of ωit, defined by ω¯it+1R
k
t+1qtKit+1 = R
l
it+1Bit+1, Γ(ω¯)
is the financial intermediary’s expected share of gross returns, given by Γ(ω¯it) = [1 −
F (ω¯it)]ω¯it+
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω), and where G(ω¯) is given by G(ω¯it) =
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω). Equation (3)
defines a menu of contracts for a given level of net-worth Xit+1 relating the entrepreneur’s
choice of Kit+1 to the cut-off level of ω¯it+1.
3.4 Entrepreneur’s problem
The ith entrepreneur’s gross return in period t, after realization of the aggregate state
but before the resolution of idiosyncratic risk, is given by
V kit =
∫ ∞
ω¯it
ωRkt qt−1KitdF (ω)−RlitBit. (4)
Given the definition of Rkit in (1), all entrepreneurial-indexed variables are predeter-
mined at the timing of the utilization decision, and thus we can simply represent the
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entrepreneur as choosing capacity utilization uit to maximize uitrt − a(uit), yielding the
first-order condition
rt = a
′(uit). (5)
For a given level of net-worth Xit+1, the entrepreneur then chooses Kit+1 capital and
the loan cut-off ωit+1 to maximze Et{V kit+1} subject to the condition that the financial
intermediary’s expected return on the contract equal its opportunity cost of its borrowing,
equation (3). Letting λit+1 be the ex-post value of the Lagrange multiplier conditional
on realization of the aggregate state, and writing the period t + 1 ex-post gross returns
as V kit+1 = [1− Γ(ω¯it+1]Rkt+1qtKit+1, where 1 − Γ(ω¯it+1) is the entrepreneur’s expected
share of gross returns, the first-order conditions are then
Γ′(ω¯it+1)− λt+1 [Γ′(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G′(ω¯it+1)] = 0 (6)
Et
{
[1− Γ(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
+ λt+1
(
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
− 1
)}
= 0 (7)
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkit+1qtKit+1 −Rat+1 (qtKit+1 −Xit+1) = 0, (8)
where (6) and (8) hold in each contingency, but (7) holds only in expectation.
3.5 Charge-offs and defaults
In sections 1 and 2 we reported that defaults and charge-offs are not perfectly correlated
in U.S. banking data and that their ratio, COD, is highly volatile. Here we show why
the baseline model has a hard time replicating these facts and how the introduction of
default cost shocks in the full model can, in theory, help the model match those facts.
We calculate the value of defaults in the model as
Deft = F (ω¯t)R
`
tBt = F (ω¯t)ω¯tR
k
t qtKt. (9)
Charge-offs are the difference between the value of defaulted loans and the resources
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obtained by financial intermediaries as part of the default process after incurring all
associated expenses. These include monitoring entrepreneurs who defaulted and the
resources needed to appropriate the returns of these projects. They are calculated as
follows
Choft = F (ω¯t)R
`
tBt − (1− θt)G(ω¯t)Rkt qtKt = [F (ω¯t)ω¯t − (1− θt)G(ω¯t)]Rkt qtKt. (10)
We can combine the two equations above to write
CODt =
Choft
Deft
=
[
1− (1− θt)G(ω¯t)
F (ω¯t)ω¯t
]
(11)
which makes it clear that the wedge between charge-offs and defaults depends on the ratio
appearing in square brackets. If θ were a fixed number, as is the case in the baseline
model, only general equilibrium changes in ω¯t would produce variation in this wedge.
As explained in section 3.3, ω¯t is the cutoff value of ωt such that the entrepreneur’s
gross payout exactly equals the contracted amount. In other words, ω¯t is defined by
ω¯tR
k
t qt−1Kt = R
`
tBt and it adjusts in response to period t shocks. For example, in
response to a positive productivity shock, the average return to capital Rkt increases
while the loan rate R` decreases forcing ω¯t down. This implies that fewer entrepreneurs
(with worse shocks) default on their loans. At the same time, the average return on the
defaulted projects is also lower. Recall that G(ω¯t) calculates the average productivity of
entrepreneurs who default while F (ω¯) is a CDF which implies that both of these quantities
are increasing in ω¯. The simultaneous impact of a change in ω¯t on both the numerator
and denominator of COD should imply relatively small changes in COD in the baseline
model compared to the data. If our conjecture is correct, then the baseline model will
display (i) a high correlation between charge-offs and defaults, and (ii) a low variance in
the COD ratio. Of course, very large shocks of just the right magnitude could in principle
generate the required volatility but they would run afoul of other macroeconomic data
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such as real GDP, aggregate investment etc. Our solution is to discipline shocks in the
baseline model using standard observables used in the New Keynesian DSGE literature
and then look at the implied movement in COD from the estimated baseline model in
the next section. The results in Section 4.1 show that our conjecture is correct.
Now suppose that θt is an exogenous random variable. As can be seen from (11),
shocks to θ have a direct positive effect on COD, over and above the general equilibrium
effect coming through the response of ω¯ discussed above. As a result, default cost shocks
break the tight link that exists between charge-offs and defaults in the baseline model and
potentially provide a source for increasing the variance of COD relative to the baseline
model. If, however, changes in ω¯t undo the impact of changes in θt, then we may not
get the desired results. The overall impact of both endogenous and exogenous sources
of movement in COD can only be ascertained by simulating the full model. We provide
these results in section 4.2.
Finally, recall that the remaining parts of the model are described in Appendix A.
That appendix also contains additional details about the agency problem and debt-
contracting problem as well as a definition of equilibrium.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline model: no default cost shocks
Our derivation of the COD ratio implied by the baseline model (see section 3.5) led to the
conjecture that the model with a constant θ would generate a very low variance in that
ratio and nearly perfectly correlated charge-offs and defaults. We test this conjecture by
studying the implications of an estimated version of the baseline model, holding θ con-
stant and only including the six stochastic processes commonly found in the literature.
Measurement error is introduced on consumption, hours, real wage and investment. The
observables used in the model estimation are commonplace – nominal interest rate, the
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inflation rate, total hours, and the growth rates of GDP, aggregate consumption, aggre-
gate investment, and real wage. In addition to these, financial accelerator models also
include the credit spread and we follow suit. Details on data construction and sources
can be found in Appendix B.
4.1.1 Parameterization
In this section we explain how we attribute values to parameters. We group model
parameters in two sets. The first one contains parameters that are not estimated while
the second one contains those estimated using Bayesian methods as in An and Schorfheide
(2007). Since the main goal of estimating the baseline model is to obtain the overall
movement in ω¯t due to the combined general equilibrium effect of all the shocks in the
baseline model, we choose to calibrate all non-shock related parameters to the values
estimated in the literature. Later, when we estimate the full model with default cost
shocks added to the current set of shocks, this approach will have the advantage that all
changes will be the result of new estimates of the stochastic elements of the model and
none will be due to changes in parameters. For completeness, we note that our results are
not sensitive to actually estimating the typical parameters around our calibrated values.
For parameters in the non-estimated set, we use typical values established in the
literature or we choose the parameters to match relevant steady state quantities in the
model economy with analogous quantities in the data. The values of parameters not
estimated are shown in Table 2. Beginning with the parameters common to standard
real-business cycle models, we set the share of labor in production, α to 0.67, and the
depreciation of physical capital, δ to 0.025. On the preference side, we set the household’s
subjective discount factor β to 0.99, implying a net annualized risk-free interest rate of
4.1%, and implying a quarterly gross return on household financial assets Rd = (1 +
rf )0.25 = 1.0101. Three other parameters appear in the utility function in equation
(A.16). They are the curvature parameter on the disutility of labour (σL), the weight on
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the disutility of labour in the utility function (ΨL), and the consumption habit persistence
parameters (b). We follow Christiano et al (2014a) and set σL = 1. We set ΨL so that
the household time allocated to market work hours is normalized to 0.3. We come back
to the habit parameter below.
Table 2: Parameters not estimated
Description Parameter Value
Household subjective discount factor β 0.99
Curvature on disutility of labour σL 1
Steady state hours-worked Nss 0.3
Habit persistence parameter b 0.8
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Curvature, investment adjustment cost s′′ 6
Curvature, utilization cost u 2
Labour share in production α 0.67
Household share of total labour in production τ 0.99
Monetary policy smoothing parameter ρrn 0.8
Monetary policy weight on inflation φpi 1.75
Monetary policy weight on output growth φy 0.2
Calvo price stickiness ζp 0.7
Calvo wage stickiness ζw 0.8
Price indexing weight on inflation ιp 0.2
Wage indexing weight on inflation ιw 0.5
Steady state price markup λp ≡ 1/νp 1.1
Steady state wage markup λw ≡ 1/νw 1.1
Steady state government spending-GDP ratio G
Y
0.18
Steady state default rate Fω¯ 0.0076
Steady state external finance premium EFP 0.005
Steady state fractional monitoring cost θ 0.12
For the parameters associated with the financial contract and the entrepreneur, we
follow Bernanke et al. (1999) in setting these parameters. In steady state, the external
finance spread, Rk −Rd, equals 0.005 quarterly, leverage, K/X, is approximately 2, and
the fraction of entrepreneurs defaulting each quarter is 0.0076. We set the quarterly
survival rate of entrepreneurs to 0.9799, the variance of log ω¯ to 0.0908, and steady-state
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fraction of gross returns lost in default, θ, to 0.12.
We now discuss the parameters in the New Keynesian block of the baseline model.
Values are taken to be round numbers in the range between well known studies such as
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Ajello (2016).
The habit persistence parameter (b) is set to .8 which is in the range of .7 to .85
found in the literature. We set price and wage stickiness parameters (ζp = .7 and ζw = .8
respectively) to be within the tight range found in the literature, noting that the latter
tends to be estimated higher in many studies. Similarly, the price and wage indexation
parameters (ιp = .2 and ιw = .5), lie between the values estimated in Ajello and Smets
and Wouters (2007). The nominal interest rate smoothing parameter (ρrn) is usually
found to be very persistent. We use a value of 0.8. For the monetary policy weight on
inflation (φpi) we use 1.75 and for the monetary policy weight on output (φy) we use
0.2. The cost functions curvature parameters associated with utilization and adjustment
costs (u and s
′′ respectively) are set to 2 and 6, respectively.
We now turn to the autocorrelation and variance of our shocks. These are all esti-
mated using Bayesian methods using the prior distributions reported in Table 3. First,
all of the shocks autocorrelation parameters share a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and
standard deviation 0.2. Second, the standard deviations of all anticipated and unan-
ticipated innovations share an inverse gamma distribution with mean 1 and a standard
deviation of 10. The upper bound of the uniform distribution of the standard deviation
of the measurement error on any series (consumption, hours, investment and wages) is
10% of the standard deviation of that series. The lower bound of the uniform prior
distribution is 0.001 for all four observables.
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Table 3: Baseline Model: priors and posteriors
Description Parameter Prior Posterior 90% HPD Prior Prior
mean mean interval distrib. std dev.
autocorrelation of shocks
Technology process ρz 0.5 0.359 0.293 0.421 beta 0.2
MEI process ρmei 0.5 0.974 0.970 0.978 beta 0.2
Preference process ρJ 0.5 0.498 0.400 0.558 beta 0.2
Monetary policy process ρη 0.5 .0035 .0004 .0067 beta 0.2
Price markup process ρνp 0.5 0.918 0.905 0.932 beta 0.2
Wage markup process ρνw 0.5 0.233 0.206 0.257 beta 0.2
standard deviation of shocks
Technology, unanticipated z 1 9.545 7.393 11.133 inverse gamma 10
Technology, anticipated 4z 1 16.614 14.378 19.450 inverse gamma 10
MEI, unanticipated m 1 7.259 6.863 7.801 inverse gamma 10
Preferences, unanticipated J 1 25.678 24.127 27.815 inverse gamma 10
Monetary policy, unanticipated η 1 0.378 0.139 0.979 inverse gamma 10
Price markup, unanticipated νp 1 0.3667 0.319 0.413 inverse gamma 10
Wage markup, unanticipated νw 1 0.448 0.387 0.506 inverse gamma 10
standard deviation of measurement errors
Hours 0.203 0.404 0.402 0.405 uniform 0.117
Consumption growth 0.031 0.061 0.061 0.061 uniform 0.017
Investment growth 0.094 0.160 0.159 0.162 uniform 0.053
wage growth 0.044 0.086 0.086 0.086 uniform 0.025
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Finally, we solve the model by using standard methods to linearize the non-linear
system about its steady state.
4.1.2 Estimation results
Table 3 also reports the posterior distributions of estimated parameters. The top panel il-
lustrates the degree of persistence of shocks. Price markup shocks and marginal efficiency
of investment (MEI) shocks are the most persistent with a first-order autocorrelation co-
efficient above 0.9. Technology shocks, preference shocks and wage markup shocks are
moderately persistent (autocorrelation in the 0.3-0.5 range). Monetary policy shocks
essentially exhibit no serial correlation.
The second panel of Table 3 reveals a great deal of variation in the estimated stan-
dard deviations of the different shocks. They range from less than .5 for monetary policy
shocks, price and wage markup shocks all the way to 25.7 for preference shocks. Unan-
ticipated and anticipated shocks to technology, and MEI range from 7 for MEI to 16.6
for anticipated technology shocks. The last panel reports the mean of the estimated
posterior of the standard deviation of measurement error which tends to lie below .5. All
posterior means are slightly higher than the prior means.
4.1.3 Implications of estimated baseline model
We now compare the baseline model’s predictions to the statistics reported in the first
panel of Table 4 based on U.S. data. The second panel of that table reports two sets of
statistics. The first row reports the theoretical moments of HP filtered variables implied
by the estimated shock parameters. The second set uses the smoothed time series implied
by the parameter estimates and the estimated shocks (we HP filter the smoothed series
just like we HP filter U.S. time series). As conjectured, the standard deviation of the
COD ratio is much lower than its counterpart in U.S. data (less than 1 versus 15.6) and
the correlation of defaults and charge-offs is nearly perfect.
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Table 4: Baseline Model
SD(chof)
SD(y)
SD(def)
SD(y)
SD(COD)
SD(y)
cor(chof, def)
Panel 1: U.S. data 1984Q1-2015Q4
21.8 14.7 15.6 0.7
Panel 2: Estimated Baseline Model (no default cost shocks)
Theoretical (HP 1600) 6.6 6.4 0.3 1
Simulated (HP 1600) 18.4 17.8 0.6 1
Panel 3: Higher Variance (Theoretical; HP 1600)
double std deviation of z 7.4 7.1 0.3 1
double std deviation of 4z 6.3 6.0 0.2 1
double std deviation of m 6.8 6.6 0.3 1
double std deviation of J 5.3 5.1 0.2 1
double std deviation of η 7.4 7.1 0.3 1
double std deviation of νp 7.4 7.1 0.3 1
double std deviation of νw 6.7 6.4 0.3 1
As additional evidence that the shocks’ general equilibrium effect on ω¯ is too small
to produce significant variation in COD in the baseline model, we conduct the following
exercise: (i) keeping all parameters at the values shown in Table 3; (ii) we double the
standard deviation of one of the shocks: (iii) then we calculate theoretical moments and
report them in the third panel of Table 4. Clearly, doubling the standard deviations of
shocks has very little impact on the relative standard deviation of the COD ratio and no
effect at all on the correlation of defaults and charge-offs. We conclude that the baseline
model cannot produce the joint behavior of defaults and charge-offs.
4.2 The full model: adding stochastic default cost shocks
4.2.1 Default costs shocks — charge-offs and defaults statistics
We argued above using equation (11) that variation in θ has the potential to lower the
correlation between charge-offs and defaults as well as raise the variance of COD. We now
add these default cost shocks to the baseline model (adopting the parameters estimates
reported in Table 3) and use model simulations to document how the relevant statistics
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change with the standard deviation of anticipated and unanticipated θ shocks (denoted
σ4θ and σ
0
θ respectively) as well as with the autocorrelation parameter ρθ. The second
panel of Table 5 is divided into three parts. In the first part, we increase the standard
deviation of the surprise component from 1 to 10 keeping ρθ = 0.9 (no anticipated shocks
are included). In the second part we increase the standard deviation of the anticipated
component from 1 to 10 keeping ρθ = 0.9 (no surprise shocks are included). In the third
part, we increase ρθ from .5 to .99 (only surprise shocks are included).
Table 5: Specifications with Default Cost Shocks
SD(chof)
SD(y)
SD(def)
SD(y)
SD(COD)
SD(y)
cor(chof, def)
Panel 1: U.S. data 1984Q1-2015Q4
21.8 14.7 15.6 0.7
Panel 2: Default costs shocks added to Baseline Model
(Theoretical; HP 1600)
σ0θ σ
4
θ ρθ
0 0 0 6.6 6.4 0.3 1
1 0 0.9 6.7 6.4 0.8 0.99
10 0 0.9 12.4 7.3 7.1 0.86
0 1 0.9 6.7 6.4 0.7 0.99
0 10 0.9 10.5 7.6 7.0 0.75
10 0 0.5 9 6.4 5.7 0.78
10 0 0.99 15.3 9.6 7.2 0.93
Panel 3: Estimated Full Model
Simulated (HP 1600) 17.9 24.4 25.9 0.28
Looking at the last two columns of Table 5, it is clear that increasing the variance
of the anticipated and unanticipated intermediation costs shocks have large (and very
similar) impacts on these statistics. The standard deviation of COD relative to that
of GDP rises from below 1 to 7 while the correlation between charge-offs and defaults
falls from .99 to .86 with unanticipated shocks and .99 to .75 with anticipated shocks.
Increasing ρθ causes an increase in the correlation of charge-offs and defaults and a small
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positive impact on the relative standard deviation of COD. Additional analysis, not
displayed here, reveals that the larger the variance of the default cost shocks, the lower
the correlation and the larger is the relative standard deviation of COD. The first two
columns of the table reveal that increasing the volatility of default costs has a larger
influence on the volatility of charge-offs than on defaults, and this helps to explain why
COD becomes more variable.
4.2.2 Estimation of the full model with default cost shocks
The results in section 4.2.1 reveal that the endogenous movements in ω¯ in response to
θt shocks do not reverse the primary effects on COD. The next step is to discipline the
size of these shocks to U.S. data and use the full model, estimated without the COD
series, to make predictions about the moments of COD. These can then be compared to
the U.S. data moments discussed earlier. To do this, we use the same parameter values
and macroeconomic data as used in the estimation of the baseline model. In addition,
all stochastic series included in the baseline model are also included here with the same
priors. The only difference is the addition of default cost shocks. As before, for the
priors, all shocks are treated exactly the same. Table 6 displays the prior and posterior
distributions from this exercise.7
There is some variation across shocks in their degree of persistence and volatility.
Default cost shocks, technology shocks and price markup shocks are the most persistent
(autocorrelation coefficient=0.96) while wage markup shocks exhibits very little serial
correlation (coefficient=0.04). The persistence of other shocks lie between these two
extremes. The default cost shocks have the highest standard deviations (10 for the
unanticipated component and 12 for the anticipated one) followed by mei shocks (6) and
preference shocks (3.5). All other shocks have standard deviations less than one. The
standard deviation of measurement errors is also quite small and close to the priors.
7Estimated shocks are in Figure 6 while historical and simulated/smoothed variables are displayed
in Figure 7. These figures are in Appendix C.
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Table 6: Full Model: priors and posteriors
Description Parameter Prior Posterior 90% HPD Prior Prior
mean mean interval distrib. std dev.
autocorrelation of shocks
Technology process ρz 0.5 0.9607 0.9319 0.9907 beta 0.2
MEI process ρmei 0.5 0.8961 0.847 0.947 beta 0.2
Default cost process ρθ 0.5 0.9627 0.9471 0.9787 beta 0.2
Preference process ρJ 0.5 0.8028 0.7405 0.8684 beta 0.2
Monetary policy process ρη 0.5 0.498 0.404 0.5914 beta 0.2
Price markup process ρνp 0.5 0.9576 .9069 0.9977 beta 0.2
Wage markup process ρνw 0.5 0.0354 0.0044 0.0652 beta 0.2
standard deviation of shocks
Technology, unanticipated z 1 0.286 0.217 0.355 invg 10
Technology, anticipated 4z 1 0.322 0.233 0.413 invg 10
MEI, unanticipated m 1 6.162 4.252 8.060 invg 10
Default cost, unanticipated θ 1 10.141 8.747 11.472 invg 10
Default cost, anticipated 4θ 1 12.078 10.541 13.594 invg 10
Preferences, unanticipated J 1 3.501 3.073 3.934 invg 10
Monetary policy, unanticipated η 1 0.133 0.119 0.144 invg 10
Price markup, unanticipated νp 1 0.130 0.118 0.141 invg 10
Wage markup, unanticipated νw 1 0.436 0.388 0.482 invg 10
standard deviation of measurement errors
Hours 0.203 0.275 0.174 0.382 uniform 0.117
Consumption growth 0.031 0.058 0.054 0.061 uniform 0.017
Investment growth 0.094 0.175 0.161 0.186 uniform 0.053
wage growth 0.044 0.041 0.003 0.074 uniform 0.025
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Comparing the estimates of the shock processes to those of the baseline model, we
note a few changes. In the full model, the posterior mean of the standard deviation of
technology shocks falls a lot for both anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Preference
shocks are also estimated to be much less volatile. In terms of persistence, monetary
policy shocks display an increased autocorrelation in the full model.
Panel 3 of Table 5 displays the relative standard deviation of the COD ratio for the
smoothed COD series based on the actual estimated shocks in the full model. It is clear
that the full model is successful at producing volatility in COD with a relative standard
deviation of 25.9 versus 0.6 in the baseline model. It is also successful at lowering the
correlation of charge-offs and defaults (0.28 versus 1 in the baseline model). Furthermore,
the third panel of Table 7 shows that in the full model COD is negatively correlated with
output and investment just like in U.S. data (see panel 1). Remarkably, the full model
matches exactly the correlation of COD and credit spreads. This correlation is 0.4 while
the baseline model predicts a correlation of 1 (see panel 2). We reiterate that the shocks
in the full model were estimated without using COD as an observable.
Table 7: Statistics
Panel 1: U.S. data 1984Q1-2015Q4
Y I cdt sprd COD
correl w/ COD -0.2 -0.3 0.4 1.0
Std Dev. 1.1 4.5 18.0 16.4
Panel 2: Baseline Model
Y I cdt sprd COD
correl w/ COD -0.5 -0.4 1.0 1.0
Std Dev. 1.1 4.0 18.0 0.6
Panel 3: Full Model
Y I cdt sprd COD
correl w/ COD -0.5 -0.8 0.4 1.0
Std Dev. 1.1 4.5 18.0 27.3
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Figure 3: COD (U.S. data) and θ (full model)
Gunn and Johri (2013) argue that default cost shocks help understand the boom-bust
cycle associated with the “great recession”. A glance at Figure 3 reveals that COD was
below trend in the quarters preceding the financial crisis while output boomed. This was
followed by a sharp rise in COD above trend during the crisis while output plummeted
below trend. The path of the default cost shock θ based on the estimated model is
displayed in Figure 3. It provides a visualization of the ideas discussed in Gunn and
Johri (2013). In addition, Figure 3 suggests that variation in default costs may have
played an important role in other boom-bust episodes as well.
We can use variance decomposition analysis based on the full model to understand
the contribution of default cost shocks to U.S. business cycles at various horizons. The
top panel of Table 8 reports the unconditional variance decomposition results. Since
default cost shocks were shown in Gunn and Johri (2013) to cause large movements in
credit spreads, it is not surprising that they account for 98% of the variance in credit
spreads. Interestingly, they also account for a noticeable fraction (at least 30%) of the
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variance of all observables except real wage growth. Price markup shocks also have an
important role. They account for more than 15% of the variance of hours worked, output
growth, inflation and wage rate growth. Preference shocks explain half of the variance
in consumption growth while wage markup shocks explain 70% of the variance of wage
growth. Finally, MEI shocks explain nearly 20% of the variance in investment growth.
Table 8: Model with default cost shocks: variance decomposition
Observable z z4 m η νp νw J θ θ
4
Unconditional variance decomposition
Hours worked 1.01 1.33 12.19 3.17 18.44 7.06 4.75 17.54 34.51
Consumption growth 1.45 1.55 2.33 1.52 7.49 3.15 50.02 10.97 21.52
Output growth 1.77 1.52 7.72 4.95 16.97 4.85 6.5 14.87 40.86
Investment growth 0.45 0.41 19.25 0.93 5.66 1.36 0.64 26.97 44.33
Nominal int. rate 1.01 0.61 10.9 5.13 9.09 4.35 3.39 22.68 42.83
Inflation 2.33 1.12 7.96 2.03 21.21 9.44 3.29 17.84 34.79
Wage growth rate 1.78 0.85 0.89 0.14 19.05 70.65 0.09 2.12 4.44
Credit spread 0.04 0.03 0.75 0.58 0.7 0.15 0.09 56.68 40.98
1-Period ahead Conditional variance decomposition
Hours worked 2.83 0.86 3.91 5.84 12.13 6.84 5.52 18.46 43.61
Consumption growth 1.54 1.45 1.12 1.88 7.83 3.15 60.03 7.66 15.34
Output growth 1.5 0.95 3.87 6.01 15.55 3.98 5.68 18.55 43.92
Investment growth 0.38 0.24 20.91 1.08 4.97 1.1 0.44 29.01 41.87
Nominal int. rate 1.53 0.07 5.35 21.46 13.33 6.51 3.31 15.63 32.81
Inflation 3.23 0.01 5.64 1.77 28.85 12.81 2.81 14.79 30.08
Wage growth 1.96 0.08 0.53 0.13 20.74 71.64 0.11 1.52 3.3
Credit spread 0.05 0.01 1.62 1.1 1.02 0.19 0.03 87.41 8.57
Conditional variance decompositions at horizons one, three, eight and twelve periods
ahead share the patterns documented above for the unconditional decomposition. One
difference between the latter results and the one-period ahead variance decomposition
(see second panel of Table 8) is the role of monetary policy shocks that account for 21% of
the variance in the nominal interest rate.8 The one-period ahead decomposition gives us
a sense of the magnitude of the pure news effect of an anticipated shock (i.e. the effects on
8Three, eight and twelve-period ahead variance decompositions are in Appendix C.
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endogenous variables after the news is received but before the shock is actually realized).9
The second panel of Table 8 shows that the pure news effect of the anticipated default cost
shock is very significant for several of the observables. A pattern appearing in all variance
decomposition results is that, except for credit spreads, the anticipated component of
default cost shocks always explains more than the unanticipated component.
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a surprise positive shock to θ. A rise in θt
means that all else equal, the financial intermediary loses a larger share of the value of
defaulting loans in that period. In order to cover its lower net of costs return on defaulted
loans and satisfy its zero profit condition, the financial intermediary then raises the loan
rate rlt, driving up the credit spread. This increases the proportion of loans that default
as entrepreneurs are forced to pay higher borrowing costs. Moreover, since the financial
intermediary loses a larger fraction of each unit of defaulted loans due to the rise in θt,
charge-offs have to increase more than defaults, and the COD ratio rises immediately.
Additionally, since θt is persistent, the rise in θt implies a rise in θt+1, altering the terms
for new loan contracts established in period t. In particular, the rise in θt+1 shifts
the menu of contracts describing the combinations of cut-off productivity and leverage
consistent with the terms of the contract, such that the rise in θt+1 reduces the level of
leverage consistent with the contract. All else equal, this leads to a fall in demand for
new physical capital by entrepreneurs leading into period t+ 1. This kicks off a chain of
general equilibrium effects that leads to an overall fall in aggregate activity. See Gunn
and Johri (2013) for a detailed discussion.
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to a four period out anticipated positive shock
to θ that is eventually realized four periods out. The impact of the anticipated shock
in Figure 5 is similar to that of the case of the persistent surprise shock in Figure 4,
9Note that Sims (2016) argues that unconditional variance decompositions and conditional variance
decompositions at horizons greater than the news shock anticipation horizon (defined as the time gap
between the period when the news is received and the period where the exogenous variable actually
changes) do not provide an accurate calculation of the pure news effect of an anticipated shock because
they combine together the pure news effect of the anticipated shock on observables and the effects
triggered by the actual realization of the shock.
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except that with no actual change in θ in the initial period, the initial impact on the
financial intermediary’s zero-profit condition is absent. Instead, the sole initial impact
effect is through the anticipated shift in contractual terms leading into the expected
change in θ in four periods, resulting in a direct drop in the demand for new capital
and economic activity in that period. This expected impact on economic activity in
four periods then triggers a drop in activity in the preceding periods through various
inter-temporal channels described in detail in Gunn and Johri (2013) and Gunn (2018).
Importantly - and in contrast to the surprise shock case in Figure 4 - all of the initial
response of credit spreads, charge-offs and CODs in the three periods preceding the rise
in θ are due to general equilibrium effects only10. Thus while credit spreads and charge-
offs rise on impact, they only reach their peak later when default costs θ actually rise.
Furthermore, COD barely moves on impact, movements in ω¯ being its only driving force
absent any variation in θ.
The larger contribution of the anticipated component of default cost shocks shown in
the variance decompositions earlier can also be seen in Figures 4 and 5. To make the com-
parison of these two sets of responses more meaningful, we set the standard deviations
of the surprise and news components to the same value. A comparison of Figures 4 and
5 reveals that the initial responses of output growth, inflation, hours, wage growth, con-
sumption growth and nominal interest rate are similar in both figures but slightly larger
in Figure 5 (anticipated shock). The slightly larger responses to an anticipated shock,
combined with the larger estimated standard deviation of anticipated shocks (20% larger
than surprise shocks) explain the larger shares of variance of observables explained by
the anticipated component of default cost shocks versus their unanticipated component.
To understand why the surprise component of default cost shocks is more important
than the anticipated component for the variance of the credit spread (especially at short
10Note however that if the news shock is realized four periods out, there will be a rise in θ four periods
out that will impact the financial intermediary’s budget constraint in that future period through the
realized change in θ in the future, thereby also impacting COD significantly in that period. In contrast, a
pure unrealized news shock to θ can only impact COD through general equilibrium effects at all horizons.
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Figure 4: IRFs surprise θ shock
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Figure 5: IRFs anticipated θ shock
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horizons), it is instructive to relate this result to the impulse responses in figures 4 and
5 and to the correlation of credit spreads with output and investment in U.S. data. The
1-period ahead variance decomposition shows that unanticipated θ shocks explain almost
all of the variance in credit spread in the very short run. As explained above and as seen
in the figures, it is clear that unanticipated default cost shocks are more effective at
producing variance in credit spread in the very short run since the initial response to a
θ news shocks is much smaller (about 3 times smaller) than the response to a surprise θ
shock. Also, as Figure 5 shows, the initial response of credit spread to a θ news shock
is muted with most of the adjustment in credit spread happening when θ actually goes
up four periods after the news arrives. This pattern of response would tend to produce a
negative correlation between current output (investment) and credit spreads four period
later. However, the correlation of output (investment) with credit spreads four period
later is only 0.09 (0.04) in our U.S. data. Hence, to capture the co-movement of credit
spread with key macro aggregates like output and investment, anticipated default cost
shocks play a less prominent role than surprise shocks.
We conclude that a business cycle model augmented with default cost shocks can not
only help rationalize the behavior of COD and credit spread but also play an important
role in the observed variation of hours worked, investment growth, and output growth
over the business cycle.
5 Conclusions
U.S. banks are required to charge-off the value of losses incurred on delinquent loans
including all costs incurred as part of the default process. We show that the total amount
charged-off does not mechanically follow the total value of defaulted funds as both vary
over the business cycle. Moreover, the ratio of charge-offs to defaults is highly volatile
and negatively correlated with GDP and positively correlated with credit spreads.
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In this paper we show that the canonical business cycle model with bank lending and
endogenous defaults associated with Bernanke et al. (1999) cannot explain the patterns
discussed above. This occurs because default costs rise and fall in proportion to the
value of defaulted loans. Next, we show that the introduction of default cost shocks
in the model can reconcile the model predictions with the data. Finally we discipline
the default cost shocks to U.S. macroeconomic data in a medium scale New Keynesian
Financial Accelerator model with a large number of other stochastic processes in addition
to default cost shocks. The model augmented with default costs fits U.S. macroeconomic
data well and variance decomposition exercises reveal that default cost shocks play a
significant role in explaining variance in these series. Our results suggest that between
1984 and 2015 shocks within the financial sector contributed to over half the variance in
the growth rate of real GDP. We use the ratio of total charge-offs over defaults to provide
external validity to the estimated model by comparing the predicted moments to actual
U.S. data and find that the model does a good job in predicting moments associated with
this ratio.
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A Additional Model Detail
A.1 Agency problem and debt-contract
The discussion in the main text regarding the financial intermediary implies that in each
aggregate state in period t, the financial intermediary’s budget constraint is
ξt = R
a
tAt, (A.1)
where ξt is the intermediary’s return on its entire loan portfolio after idiosyncratic un-
certainty has been realized, and where Rat and At are predetermined.
In the financial contract, the cut-off value ω¯it is defined as
ω¯it+1R
k
t+1qtKit+1 = R
l
t+1Bit+1. (A.2)
If the entrepreneur’s realization exceeds the threshold such that ωt+1(i) ≥ ω¯t+1(i), the
entrepreneur pays the financial intermediary the contracted amount Rlit+1Bit+1, keeping
the amount ωit+1R
k
t+1qtKit+1 − Rlit+1Bit+1. If ωit+1 < ω¯it+1, the entrepreneur defaults,
receives nothing, and the financial intermediary receives (1 − θt)ωit+1Rkt+1qtKit+1. As
with Rlit, ω¯it adjusts to reflect the aggregate ex-post realizations of the aggregate state
in period t.
Given these contract details, we can write the financial intermediary’s expected return
on a given loan contract in a given aggregate contingency in period t+ 1 as
ξit+1 = [1− F (ω¯it+1)]Rlit+1Bit+1 + (1− θt+1)
∫ ω¯it+1
0
ωRkt+1qtKit+1dF (ω) (A.3)
Substituting in (A.2), we can write (A.3) in terms of the cut-off ω¯ as
ξ(ω¯it+1, θt+1) =
[
[1− F (ω¯it+1)]ω¯it+1 + (1− θt+1)
∫ ω¯it+1
0
ωdF (ω)
]
Rkt+1qtKit+1. (A.4)
Defining the financial intermediary’s expected share of gross returns Γ(ω¯) as
Γ(ω¯it) = [1− F (ω¯it)]ω¯it +
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω), (A.5)
and defining G(ω¯) as
G(ω¯it) =
∫ ω¯it
0
ωdF (ω), (A.6)
we can re-write the financial intermediary’s expected return on a given loan contract in
a given aggregate contingency as
ξt+1(ω¯it+1, θt+1) = [Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKit+1, (A.7)
where the terms in square brackets represent the financial intermediary’s share of profits
net of default costs. The requirement that the financial intermediary earn an expected
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return in every aggregate contingency equal to its opportunity cost of funds,
ξt+1(ω¯it+1, θt+1) = Rt+1Bit+1 (A.8)
then serves as a restriction to define a menu of contracts over loan quantity and cut-off
value for the entrepreneur. Substituting in qtKit+1 = Xit+1 + Bit+1 and (A.7) we can
then write this as
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKt+1(i) = Rat+1 (qnt Kit+1 −Xit+1) (A.9)
which for a given level of net-worth Xit+1 defines a menu of contracts relating the en-
trepreneur’s choice of Kit+1 to the cut-off ω¯it+1.
A.2 Entrepreneur’s contract problem
The entrepreneur’s expected gross return, conditional on the ex-post realization of the
aggregate state but before the resolution of idiosyncratic risk, is given by
V kit+1 =
∫ ∞
ω¯it+1
ωRkt+1qtKit+1dF (ω)−Rlit+1Bit+1. (A.10)
Substituting in the definitions above yields
V kit+1 = [1− Γ(ω¯it+1)]Rkt+1qtKit+1, (A.11)
where 1− Γ(ω¯it+1) is the entrepreneur’s expected share of gross returns.
For a given level of net-worth Xit+1, the entrepreneur’s optimal contacting problem
is then
maxKit+1,ω¯it+1Et{V kit+1} (A.12)
subject to the condition that the financial intermediary’s expected return on the contract
equal its opportunity cost of its borrowing, equation (3). Letting λit+1 be the ex-post
value of the Lagrange multiplier conditional on realization of the aggregate state, the
first-order conditions are then
Γ′(ω¯it+1)− λt+1 [Γ′(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G′(ω¯it+1)] = 0 (A.13)
Et
{
[1− Γ(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
+ λt+1
(
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)] R
k
t+1
Rat+1
− 1
)}
= 0 (A.14)
[Γ(ω¯it+1)− θt+1G(ω¯it+1)]Rkit+1qtKit+1 −Rat+1 (qnt Kit+1 −Xit+1) = 0 (A.15)
where (A.13) and (A.15) hold in each contingency, but (A.14) holds only in expectation.
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A.3 Household
The stand-in household’s lifetime utility is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtJt
[
log(Ct − bCt−1)−ΨLN
h
t
1+σL
1 + σL
]
(A.16)
where Ct is consumption, Nt is hours-worked, β is the subjective discount factor and
Jt follows an exogenous stochastic preference process which we refer to as a preference
shock.
The household enters into each period with real financial securities At which serve as
deposits with the financial intermediary, and nominal bonds Bnt , earning risk-free gross
real rate of return Rat and risk-free gross nominal rate of return R
n
t respectively, receiving
nominal wage W ht for supplying hours N
h
t to the labour union, and receiving a share of
real profits from the capital-producers, goods-producers, financial intermediary, labour
union and employment agency, denoted collectively as Ft. At the end of the period,
the household chooses its consumption Ct, its holdings of financial securities At+1 and
nominal nominal bonds Bnt+1. The household’s period t budget constraint is given by
Ct + At+1 +
Bnt+1
Pt
= RatAt +R
n
t
Bnt
Pt
+
W ht
Pt
Nht + Ft, (A.17)
where Pt is the price of the final good in terms of the nominal unit under the control of
the central bank. The household’s problem is to choose sequences of Ct, N
h
t , At+1 and
Bnt+1 to maximize (A.16) subject to (A.17).
Letting λt be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s budget con-
straint, the first-order conditions with respect to Ct, N
h
t , At+1 and B
n
t+1 are respectively
λt =
Jt
Ct − bCt−1 − βbEt
Jt+1
Ct+1 − bCt (A.18)
λt
W ht
Pt
= ΨLJtN
h
t
σL (A.19)
λt = βEtR
a
t+1 (A.20)
λt = βEtR
n
t+1
Pt
Pt+1
. (A.21)
A.4 Final goods firm and intermediate goods firms
The final goods firm produces the final good Yt by combining differentiated intermediate
goods yjt, j ∈ [0, 1], according to the technology
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
νpt
jt dj
] 1
νpt
, 0 < νp ≤ 1. (A.22)
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where νpt follows an exogenous stochastic process which we refer to as a price markup
shock. The producer acquires each jth intermediate good at price Pjt, and sells the
final good at price Pt where it may be used as a consumption or as an input into the
production of investment goods. Each period the producer chooses intermediate goods
yjt ∀j to maximize profits PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pjtyjtdj, yielding a standard demand curve
yjt =
[
Pjt
Pt
] 1
νp−1
Yt, (A.23)
for the jth intermediate good, and nominal price index
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P
νp/(νp−1)
jt dj
] (νp−1)
νp
. (A.24)
The jth intermediate goods firms produces the differentiated good yjt according to
the technology
yjt = ztn˜
α
jtk˜
1−α
jt , (A.25)
where zt is total factor productivity that follows an exogenous stochastic process which
we refer to as a technology shock, n˜jt is total hours-worked, and k˜jt is physical capital
services. Hours-worked is a composite of both household and entrepreneurial labour,
such that n˜jt = n
Ω
jt(n
e
jt)
1−Ω, where njt is worker labour, nejt is entrepreneurial labour ,
and where Ω parameterizes the elasticity of the hours composite to household labour.
Capital services is defined by k˜jt = ujtkit, where kjt is the stock of physical capital and
ujt is the utilization rate of that stock, chosen by the entrepreneurs.
The jth firm hires njt and n
e
jt at wage rates Wt and w
e
t respectively, rents capital
services k˜jt at rate rt, and sells its output at price Pjt. Intermediate goods firms have
market power, and can thus set prices subject to the demand curve (A.23). The firms
face Calvo frictions in setting their prices such that each period they can re-optimize
prices with probability 1 − ζp. A firm that is unable to re-optimize its price in a given
period re-sets it according to the indexation rule Pjt = Pjt−1pi
ιp
t−1pi
1−ιp , 0 ≤ ιp ≤ 1,
where pit = Pt/Pt−1 and pi is its steady state, and where 0 ≤ ιp ≤ 1. A firm that can
re-optimize its price in period t chooses its price P ∗jt to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζspβ
sλt+sPt
λtPt+1
[
P ∗jt(Π
s
k=1pi
ιw
t+k−1pi
1−ιw)yjt+s − Pt+sS(yjt+s)
]
, (A.26)
where βs λt+sPt
λtPt+1
is the household owner’s nominal discount factor, given the production
technology (A.25) and the demand curve for yjt, and where S(yjt) is the firm’s real cost
function as a solution to its cost-minimization problem for a given level of output yjt.
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A.5 Employment agency and employment unions
The employment agency combines differentiated labour nqt, q ∈ [0, 1], into a composite
Nt according to
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
nνwtqt dq
] 1
νwt
, 0 < νw ≤ 1. (A.27)
where νwt follows an exogenous stochastic process which we refer to as a wage markup
shock. Each period the agency acquires each qth differentiated labour service at wage Wqt
from the labour union, and sells the composite labour to the intermediate goods producers
for wage Wt. The agency chooses nqt ∀q to maximize profits WtNt−
∫ 1
0
Wqtnqtdq, yielding
a demand function
nqt =
[
Wqt
Wt
] 1
νw−1
Nt, (A.28)
for the qth labour type, and wage index
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
W
νw/(νw−1)
qt dq
] (νw−1)
νw
. (A.29)
The qth labour union acquires labour Nht from the household at wage W
h
t , differenti-
ates it into labour type nqt, q ∈ [0, 1], and then sells it to the employment agency for wage
Wqt. The unions have market power, and can thus choose the wage for each labour type
subject to the labour demand curve (A.28). The unions face Calvo frictions in setting
their wages, such that each period they can re-optimize wages with probability 1 − ζw.
A union that is unable to re-optimize wages re-sets it according to the indexation rule
Wqt = Wqt−1piιwt−1pi
1−ιw , 0 ≤ ιw ≤ 1, where pit = Pt/Pt−1 and pi is its steady state, and
where 0 ≤ ιw ≤ 1. A union that can re-optimize its wage in period t chooses its wage
W ∗qt to maximize
Et
∞∑
s=0
ζswβ
sλt+sPt
λtPt+1
[
W ∗qt(Π
s
k=0pi
ιw
t+k−1pi
1−ιw)−W ht+s
]
nqt+s, (A.30)
subject to the demand curve for nqt.
A.6 Capital-producer
The competitive capital-goods producer operates a technology that combines existing
capital with new investment goods to create new installed capital. At the end of each
period it purchases existing capital Kkt from entrepreneurs at price q¯t, combining it with
investment It to yield new capital stock K
nk
t , which it sells back to entrepreneurs in the
same period at price qt. The capital-producer faces investment adjustment costs in the
creation of new capital, and incurs depreciation in the process, so that
Knkt = (1− δ)Kkt + It
[
1− S
(
mtIt
It−1
)]
, (A.31)
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where mt follows an exogenous stochastic process that we refer to as a marginal efficiency
of investment (MEI) shock (see Justiniano et al. (2010)), and S(x) is an investment
adjustment cost function based on Christiano et al. (2005) with the properties S(x) = 0,
S ′(x) = 0, and S ′′(x) = s′′, where s′′ is a parameter. The capital producer’s period t
profits are given by Πkt = q
n
t K
nk
t −qtKkt −It. Since the capital producer faces intertemporal
investment adjustment costs, it faces a dynamic problem, choosing Knkt , K
k
t and It to
maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλt
λ0
Πkt (A.32)
subject to (A.31).
The capital producer’s first-order conditions are given by
q¯t = qt(1− δ) (A.33)
qnt −
1
Υt
− qnt S
(
mtIt
It−1
)
− qnt S ′
(
mtIt
It−1
)
mtIt
It−1
+Et
{
βλt+1
λt
qnt+1mt+1
I2t+1
I2t
S ′
(
mt+1It+1
It
)}
.
(A.34)
A.7 Monetary policy
Monetary policy takes the form of a monetary authority that sets the gross nominal
interest rate Rnt+1 according to a rule in the form
Rnt+1
Rn
=
(
Rnt
Rn
)ρR [(Πt
Π
)φpi ( Yt
Yt−1
)φy]1−ρR
ηt, (A.35)
where variables without subscripts are steady-state values, Πt is the gross inflation rate,
and ηt follows an exogenous stochastic process that we refer to as a monetary policy
shock.
A.8 Stochastic processes
There are 7 stochastic processes in the model: Jt (preference), νpt (price markup), νwt
(wage markup), zt (technology), θt (DC), η (monetary policy) and mt (MEI). All the
stochastic processes Ξt, where Ξ = Jt, νpt, νwt, zt, θt, ηt,mt, evolve according to the sta-
tionary process
ln(Ξt/Ξ) = ρΞ ln(Ξt−1/Ξ) + uΞt, (A.36)
where ρΞ < 1, Ξ denotes the mean of the process and uΞt is the shock innovation. We
potentially allow for news shocks to the technology and default cost processes, such that
for these processes, the innovation uΞt contains both an anticipated and unanticipated
component, whereas for the remaining stochastic processes, the innovation uΞt contains
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only an unanticipated component, such that
uΞt =
{
pΞt−p + 
0
Ξt Ξ = {zt, θt}
0Ξt Ξ = {Jt, νpt, νwtmt ηt}
(A.37)
where p > 0, pΞt−p is a news shock that agents receive in period t−p about the innovation
in t, and 0Ξt is a surprise shock. All shocks are mean zero and uncorrelated over time
and with each other. The news and surprise shocks have standard deviation σpΞ and σ
0
Ξ
respectively.
A.9 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this economy is defined by contingent sequences of Ct, c
e
t (i)∀i, Nt, Nth ,
njt∀j, ujt∀j, nejt∀j, Pjt∀j, yjt∀j, It, At+1, Kit+1∀i, uit∀i, Bit+1∀i, ω¯it+1∀i, Knkt , Kkt , Bnt+1,
Wt, W
h
t , W
e
t , Wqt, rt, R
a
t+1, R
l
it+1∀i, Rkt , q¯t, qt, Rnt , Pt, that satisfy the following conditions:
(i) the allocations solve the household’s, final goods-producer’s, intermediate goods pro-
ducers’, financial intermediary’s, entrepreneurs’, capital producer’s, employment agency’s
and employment union’s problems, taking prices as given, (ii) all markets clear, (iii)
the resource constraint Ct + C
e
t + q
n
t Φ(
It
Kt
Kt) + θtG(ω¯t)q
n
t−1R
k
tKt = Yt holds, where∫ 1
0
Kit+1 = Kt+1,
∫ 1
0
Bit+1 = Bt+1,
∫ 1
0
Xit+1 = Xt+1,
∫ 1
0
ceit+1 = C
e
t+1,
∫ 1
0
N ei = N
e = 1 and
where all entrepreneurs choose the same cut-off such that ω¯it+1 = ω¯t+1 ∀i, and therefore
Rlit+1 = R
l
t+1 ∀i.
Equilibrium in the capital goods market implies that Knkt = Kt+1 and K
k
t = Kt, and
equilibrium in the securities market implies that At = Bt. Nominal bonds are in zero
net-supply such that Bnt = 0.
In equilibrium the financial intermediary’s return on its entire loan portfolio just
covers its opportunity cost of funds, implying that its budget constraint holds in every
aggregate contingency and after idiosyncratic uncertainty is resolved as
[Γ(ω¯t+1)− θt+1G(ω¯t+1)]Rkt+1qtKt+1 = Rat+1At+1. (A.38)
Aggregate net-worth evolves as the accumulated gross returns of surviving entrepreneurs
plus their labour income. Letting Vt be aggregate gross entrepreneurial returns, we can
compute it as the average gross idiosyncratic returns,
Vt = [1− Γ(ω¯t)]Rkt qnt−1Kt, (A.39)
which after making substitutions yields
Vt = R
k
t q
n
t−1Kt −
[
RatBt + θtG(ω¯t)R
k
t q
n
t−1Kt
]
, (A.40)
so that aggregate net-worth evolves as
Xt+1 = γVt + w
e
t . (A.41)
Finally, entrepreneurial consumption Cet is equal to the aggregated gross return of dying
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entrepreneurs,
Cet = (1− γ)Vt. (A.42)
For reference later in the discussion of our results, we also define the equilibrium real
risk-free net interest rate as rft =
1
Etβ
λ1t+1
λ1t
− 1, the credit spread as Rlt−Rat , and leverage
as Lt =
qnt Kt+1
Xt+1
.
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B Data
• Real Gross Domestic Product, 3 Decimal, Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars, Quar-
terly, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate.
Source: search on series code GDPC96 at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Gross Domestic Product - Implicit Price Deflator - 1996=100, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: search on series code GDPDEF at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Personal Consumption Expenditures, Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted An-
nual Rate
Source: search on series code PCEC at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Fixed Private Investment, Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate
Source: search on series code FPI at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Civilian Employment: Sixteen Years and Over, Thousands, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: search on series code CE16OV at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Effective Federal Funds Rate
Source: search on FEDFUNDS at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Average Weekly Hours Duration, Nonfarm Business, All Persons, : index, 1992 =
100, Seasonally Adjusted
Source: search on series code PRS85006023 at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Hourly Compensation Duration, Nonfarm Business, All Persons, : index, 1992 =
100, Seasonally Adjusted.
Source: Search series id PRS85006103 at U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate
• Labor Force Status : Civilian noninstitutional population - Age : 16 years and over
- Seasonally Adjusted - Number in thousands.
Source: Search series id LNS10000000 at U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics,
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate
• Credit Spread: Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield on
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity, Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted.
Source: search on series code BAA10YM at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
• Charge-offs: Total charge-offs on Total Loans and Leases, All FDIC-Insured Insti-
tutions, Millions of Dollars,
Source: Quarterly Loan Portfolio Performance Indicators
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/qbp/timeseries/loan-performance.xls
• Defaults: Loans 90 days or more past due, All FDIC-Insured Institutions, Millions
of Dollars,
Source: Quarterly Loan Portfolio Performance Indicators
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/qbp/timeseries/loan-performance.xls
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• QUSPAMUSDA: Total Credit to Private Non-Financial Sector, Adjusted for Breaks,
for United States. Source: search on series code QUSPAMUSDA at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
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C Additional results
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Figure 6: Shocks from full model estimation
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Figure 7: Historical and Smoothed Variables - full model estimation
48
Table 9: Conditional variance decomposition
:
Observable z z4 m η νp νw J θ θ
4
3-Period ahead
Hours worked 0.51 1.32 8.11 4.06 15.03 6.41 4.98 17.67 41.9
Consumption growth 1.9 1.97 1.3 1.63 9.52 3.8 51.88 9.33 18.66
Output growth 1.78 1.36 8.28 4.38 16.95 4.54 4.75 17.21 40.75
Investment growth 0.41 0.32 18.35 0.83 5.26 1.17 0.51 28.09 45.06
Nominal int. rate 1.38 0.03 8.02 8.79 11.66 5.88 3.66 19.81 40.78
Inflation 2.26 0.03 7.37 1.97 19.32 8.97 3.22 18.89 37.97
Wage growth 2.21 0.37 0.52 0.12 23.79 68.13 0.12 1.49 3.26
Credit spread 0.05 0.01 1.93 1.2 1.06 0.17 0.02 86.85 8.71
8-Period ahead
Hours worked 0.25 0.64 11.05 2.37 16.87 5.82 2.54 20.34 40.12
Consumption growth 1.99 2.45 1.55 1.57 9.66 3.81 50.32 9.58 19.08
Output growth 1.7 1.75 8.88 3.74 15.77 4.16 4.61 17.74 41.65
Investment growth 0.40 0.43 16.15 0.68 5.07 1.08 0.52 27.82 47.85
Nominal int. rate 0.72 0.27 9.74 2.39 5.4 3.01 2.93 25.87 49.67
Inflation 1.34 0.71 8.23 1.71 11.18 5.29 2.79 23.47 45.28
Wage growth 2.16 1.51 0.74 0.12 23.41 66.28 0.12 1.81 3.86
Credit spread 0.03 0.01 2.81 1.08 0.79 0.1 0.03 61.15 34.01
12-Period ahead
Hours worked 0.25 0.55 11.11 1.73 15.57 4.91 1.63 22.03 42.23
Consumption growth 1.74 2.14 2.62 1.42 8.48 3.4 47.32 11.11 21.77
Output growth 1.67 1.72 8.67 3.72 15.52 4.19 4.86 17.84 41.81
Investment growth 0.41 0.43 16.34 0.71 5.11 1.13 0.54 27.67 47.67
Nominal int. rate 0.5 0.29 9.17 1.56 3.61 2.08 2.32 27.66 52.81
Inflation 1.16 0.63 7.8 1.51 9.76 4.58 2.48 24.62 47.46
Wage growth 2.07 1.47 1.25 0.14 22.44 63.9 0.12 2.85 5.75
Credit spread 0.03 0.02 4.89 1.26 0.76 0.1 0.12 58.08 34.73
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